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WORKSHOP "BRITISH AND RUSSIAN IDENTITIES AND CULTURES IN A COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE C. 1800-2000", 21–22 OCTOBER, 2019, LONDON

Предисловие
Foreword

The Arts and Humanities Research Council, part of the UK Research and Innovation, is a major funding organisation of arts and humanities research with a strong global outreach. I am very pleased that our bilateral international partnerships now include collaboration with the Russian Foundation for Basic Research. Our countries have longstanding traditions in world class research in arts and humanities disciplines and I strongly believe that jointly our two organisations will make a significant contribution to fostering research dialogue between the UK and Russia.

Over the past year we have signed a Memorandum of Understanding setting out the main principles for our collaboration. We have also taken major practical steps through organising two workshops in Moscow and London, titled "Russia and Britain in Comparative Perspective c. 1800–2000" and "British and Russian Identities and Cultures in a Comparative and Cross-Cultural Perspective c. 1800–2000" respectively. These workshops brought together leading experts in their fields of research. They provided a platform for an open exchange of views and ideas, all in all representing a unique opportunity to build links across our two Countries between researchers from the universities and cultural heritage organisations.

This publication presents a summary of presentations discussed at the two workshops. Included summaries address questions related to key concepts of identities, heritage, history and its representation, legacies of empire, social, cultural and political representation to mention a few. I very much hope that readers will find this publication interesting and thought provoking.

Finally, I would like to personally thank Academician Vladislav Yakovlevich Panchenko, Chair of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, for his leading role in our collaboration and ensuring it has such a successful start. I look forward to its continuation.

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Tendons of Empire and British Post-Colonial Influence

Столпы империи и британское постколониальное влияние

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This paper considered the period after empires end and, more especially, the broad theme of the relations between a former colonial power and its ex-colonies. It did this via a discussion of British technical and military assistance from the early 1960s. The paper had two purposes: first, to argue for the importance of technical assistance in Britain's post-colonial relations with former colonies, and to establish some key features of this; and, second, to suggest that the British experience of delivering technical assistance to ex-colonies shaped subsequent British involvement with other regions that had never been part of the British Empire, including, from c. 1990, Russia and Eastern Europe.

Technical assistance was defined by the British government as "the provision of *training*, *experts*, and *equipment*". It did not involve handing over money, and unlike capital aid, which was principally provided for expenditure on economic development, technical assistance was given across a wide range of sectors and activities. British technical assistance was delivered in two ways: multilaterally through participation in programmes run by organisations like the United Nations or the Commonwealth, and bilaterally, the form on which I focused. The provision of technical assistance became one of the defining features of international aid to emergent states in the postcolonial era. To understand why, I suggested that we need to remember that political independence at the end of empire was often the starting rather than the end point in a process of state building. The extent to which this was the case varied regionally and in relation to the character of colonial regimes, but many former colonies especially in Africa entered independence lacking established institutions that we associate with independent nation statehood as well sufficient numbers of experienced and trained local professionals to appoint to posts in them. Moreover, technical assistance was an attractive form of aid to British ministers and officials. It was not only relatively cheap compared to capital (financial) aid but helped foster enduring links between the donor and recipient. It thus (to a greater extent than capital aid) presented opportunities for the British state and institutions to exercise leverage over the affairs of new states and to disseminate British models. Technical assistance might enable the British government to place British personnel in key positions in emergent states or establish connections to those in, or likely to attain, positions of power and influence.

Through a discussion of the key British programmes for the delivery of civilian and military assistance, I showed that the end of the British empire was followed by a period of ongoing – and in some cases extensive – involvement in its former colonies, which saw Britons appointed to posts in the public services of African and Caribbean states long after they had become formally independent of Britain. As empire was ending, there was also an exponential increase in the numbers from former colonies receiving some form of training in Britain, including military training, with significant numbers of overseas officer cadets trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. In the last days of empire, the proportion of overseas to British cadets reached about 1:5, and would have risen higher if the authorities at Sandhurst had not vigorously protested that the presence of the overseas cadets was compromising their ability to fulfil their primary purpose of training British cadets. Having discussed technical and military assistance programmes run by the British state, I suggested that the larger picture of British aid is only complete if we extend our attention beyond the activities of the state itself and note the contribution of a series of institutions on the fringes of the state, such as the Bank of England, which although nationalised in 1946 retained considerable autonomy. I discussed how from the late 1950s the Bank became involved in offering a variety of forms of assistance to new states, most notably through the inauguration of a training course.

Through the provision of these forms of technical assistance the British state and non-state actors sought to advance a variety of British objectives. At the most basic level the British placed importance on maintaining British and British-trained personnel in senior roles overseas. They hoped that this might yield commercial dividends whether in relation to the purchase of British goods generally or of military hardware and arms. But British motives were also strategic and must be understood within the context of the Cold War, and a perceived "risk" that post-colonial states would look to other countries, notably Russia, for assistance, and, especially, training. Non-state actors had their own interests that they hoped to advance. For the Bank of England these included protecting sterling and the sterling area (the group of countries that based their currencies on sterling), and the promotion of the services of the City of London.

In this respect these motives – designed to secure a variety of national interests – were probably little different to those of other foreign states and actors. However, as the departing colonial power, Britain had its own, distinct, reasons for investing in technical assistance. In particular, the UK government had a responsibility to some British personnel and interests in former colonies and a vested interest in the stability of institutions in new Commonwealth states. Technical assistance and the various ongoing "tendons" of empire in postcolonial states were also not simply or straightforwardly a form of neo-colonialism. Despite repeated British attempts to allocate aid strategically, technical assistance programmes were a resource that developing states were able to manipulate to their own advantage in ways that were unforeseen and unwelcome to British governments and might undermine British efforts to target assistance where it would bring most influence.

The last part of the paper considered the ways in which decolonisation reconfigured spaces in ways which created new opportunities beyond the borders of the empire – Commonwealth. This was not simply because decolonisation gave Britain (and other countries) leave to expand their interests and services to non-Anglophone states. Rather the decolonising process – and specifically the provision of technical assistance to former British colonies – provided experience and generated initiatives that became the platform for institutional connections to states that had never been part of the British empire. Or to put it another way, British decolonisation was formative in how the British state and non-state actors engaged with the wider world in the late twentieth century.

Two different sets of examples were used to support this contention. First, I explored how the mechanisms Britain developed for the provision of military assistance principally to British colonies or Commonwealth states were used when Britain wanted to establish connections to or offer aid to foreign states. For example, the British government began funding cadets from non-CW states to attend Sandhurst; recruitment became more diverse over time. From the 1990s they included a sprinkling of cadets from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as those countries in which Britain intervened militarily in the later twentieth century. Second, I discussed a new

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venture by the Bank of England: the creation in 1990 of a Centre for Central Banking Studies. Although the Bank continued to provide courses aimed at Commonwealth countries, the origins of the Centre, lay in the priority the Bank now attached to Eastern Europe following what was referred to as a "flood of requests from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" for assistance. The Centre was conceived as a distinct initiative in response to this development, but the experience of staging the Commonwealth course provided the platform on which the Centre was built. It provides an illustration of how the process of *decolonisation* as well as colonialism could have its own distinct legacies. In its first three years, seventy per cent of participants in courses at the Centre were from Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union, and, as well as hosting delegates in London, the Bank ran training courses in Eastern European states.

In sum the British state and a variety of British institutions below the level of the state became involved in delivering technical assistance in ways that contributed towards a prolongation, and even an extension of, British connections with former colonies not just between governments but also at an institutional level. As one generation of alumni assumed senior positions in their own institutions, it reproduced, for a new generation, professional connections to British institutions. Although many postcolonial states were keen to diversify their external relations and reduce their reliance on Britain, such links nevertheless contributed to the persistence in an otherwise increasingly globalising world of networks or of some form of British "sphere" or "spheres" that map closely, but not fully, on to the Commonwealth – albeit that these "spheres" were far from coherent, were crossed by other competing associations and affected by the disintegrative forces of national and regional development. Moreover as I have suggested while institutions and organisations of other foreign states might and did intrude upon these spheres, and there was competition and divisions within them, decolonisation also reconfigured old colonial geographies in ways that could yield opportunities in other states that had never been part of the British Empire. These points led me to suggest that from a British perspective we should not view "decolonisation" as simply the final phase in British colonialism. Rather, decolonisation – the transitional phase from colonialism to the postcolonial – should be seen in more dynamic terms in which we are not just dealing with "legacies" of empire.

Science, Empire & Global Environmental Challenges in the Twentieth Century

Наука, империя и глобальные экологические вызовы XX века

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For many, the twentieth century signified a key shift in the character of the relationship between humankind and the wider environment. A range of concepts has been mobilised in order to capture the extent of this changing relationship, and this includes such notions as the Great Acceleration, biosphere-noosphere evolution, and more recently the Anthropocene. Of the many factors behind humankind's growing power with respect to the Earth's physical processes during the course of the twentieth century, the themes of science, empire and superpower interaction were of central importance. In order to open up this area for further debate, the following reflects on the activities of the USA and the Soviet Union.

The multiple ways in which these two superpowers engaged with the physical environment can be considered in relation to at least five general areas:

– Large-scale impact on natural systems through economic and military activity;

– Regulation of the environment for administrative purposes and social betterment;

– Understanding the environment and its processes for defence/military purposes;

– Utilising the environment for the advancement of international diplomacy;

– Conceptualising society-environment interaction and future trajectories.

These activities have deep roots and elements can be traced back to earlier centuries and the agendas and policies of large states and empires. For example, scholarship has drawn attention to the deleterious consequences of empire building on the natural environment of distant lands as well as the profound impact of experiencing new natural environments on the production of domestic scientific knowledge and the development of linked practices (e.g. Beinart and Hughes [1], Crosby [2], Moon [3]). James Scott [4] advanced the notion of "seeing like a state" to cast light on the myriad ways in which states have tried to gain an understanding of their physical environment in order to facilitate management of natural processes for social betterment. This approach is characterised by a strong belief in science and technology and the ability of humankind to exercise control over the physical world. Both the USA and the Soviet Union embodied these beliefs, albeit within different ideological frameworks, resulting in significant consequences for the functioning of natural processes across large parts of the globe (e.g. see McNeill and Unger [5]).

The central importance of science and related technical innovation for bringing an end to World War Two ensured that great emphasis was placed on applied areas of science post-1945 within both the US and Soviet contexts. Continued progress in areas such as nuclear weaponry and rocketry required a deep understanding of physical processes, which facilitated the forging of close links between the military, industry and higher education sectors [6]. Furthermore, disciplines such as ecology were provided with additional funding in order to assist in the assessment of the

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consequences of military action, most notably in the area of nuclear fallout.

The Cold War was a period of relatively extensive international scientific collaboration between US and Soviet academics in spite of wider political tensions. For example, the collaborative particularities of the International Geophysical Year (1957–1958) have received notable attention in recent years [7], and such initiatives were joined by later efforts, which encompassed the biological sciences (International Biological Programme, 1964–1974) as well as fields such as environmental conservation (e.g. UNESCO's Man and Biosphere Programme). In addition to such multilateral programmes, the two superpowers were party to a comprehensive unilateral initiative underpinned by the 1972 US – USSR Environmental Agreement. This spanned a range of different areas including air and water pollution, earthquake prediction, and the preservation of nature etc. [8]. The Soviet Union and USA also initiated the establishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in 1972, which would go on to carry out innovative work in areas such as energy, population, and the biosphere [9].

The activities of the Soviet Union and the USA during the Cold War period contributed to the marked upturn in humankind's impact on the Earth system post-1945, which is captured in the notion of the Great Acceleration. Furthermore, their scientists played a formative role in the emergence of influential concepts aimed at interpreting the changing character of nature – society relations more generally. For example, the ideas of the Russian biogeochemist, Vladimir Vernadsky (1863–1945), concerning the biosphere and its qualitative shift to a new evolutionary state – the noosphere – proved influential both domestically and on the international stage [10]. Taken together, the enormous power and potential unleashed by the technical and scientific achievements of these two countries in areas such as nuclear weaponry, remote-sensing, and space exploration proved key in advancing not only our collective ability to undermine aspects of the Earth system, but also in deepening our ability to measure, comprehend and potentially control physical processes at the regional and global scales.

There is still much work to be done in order to deepen our understanding of the marked shift in society – nature relations that occurred during the course of the twentieth century (see McNeill and Engelke [11]). Further analysis will also assist in uncovering the many reasons behind our current environmental predicament, which in turn will encourage critical reflection on current academic discussions and policy responses, helping to inform and shape future activities. Central to any such undertaking lies an exploration of the scientific, technical and geopolitical particularities of the Soviet Union and the USA.

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Science at the Royal Society's Tercentenary, 1960: International, Universal, Inductive

Научные исследования в трехсотлетней истории Королевского общества до 1960 г.: международные, универсальные и индуктивные методы

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My paper reflected historically on a particular statement of scientific internationalism, the documentary film *A Light in Nature,* made to mark the 300th anniversary of the Royal Society of London in 1960. In talking about this film from the British Film Institute Archive, I aimed to exemplify a kind of collections-based and interdisciplinary research that AHRC Independent Research Organisations can particularly promote. I showed the way in which the film represented the scientific enterprise, including some brief comments on how it related more broadly to the Royal Society's view of science in the quarter century from the end of the Second World War. I also described how the style of the film conveys its particular view of science.

The Account of Science in *A Light in Nature*

Before the gala film performance at London's Royal Festival Hall as part of the celebrations of the Royal Society's Tercentenary on the 22nd July 1960, the Royal Society had shown little interest in the potential of cinema to promote science. The main event at the gala was the 35-minute documentary *A Light in Nature,* the first film directed by Ramsay Short, who later directed Horizon programmes for the BBC. The proposal from the highly respected film unit of the Shell Oil Company described the film's object as being: "to give a selective panoramic view of the development of scientific thought and its application, in relation to the events of the time, throughout the last three hundred years" [1]. My paper covered three aspects of the film's account of science: its continuity with its historical roots (its universalism, if you like); its internationalism; and its identity as a curiosity-driven inductive enquiry into "fundamental problems" of understanding nature.

The first of its key characteristics is an insistence on the continuity between science at the time of the foundation of the Society in the 17th century and that being practised in the 20th century, which was also a feature of the broader tercentenary celebrations. This insistence on timelessness of science starts with the title of the film; "a light in nature" is a phrase from Francis Bacon, the 17th century natural philosopher, a key reference point for the founders of the Society. The commentary asserts: "Francis Bacon caught the spirit of this quest; «If a man could succeed, not in striking out some particular invention, but in kindling a light in Nature, in ringing a bell to call other wits together, he would disclose all that is most hidden and secret in the world»". The film includes historical figures – Descartes, Galileo, Newton – as if there were no difference between the natural philosophy of the past and the science of the present. The commentary starts: "Order your thoughts. The philosopher Descartes insisted on it. «Begin with the most simple objects so as to rise as if by steps to knowledge of the most complex»". This section culminates with the assertion: "Yesterday this was called the experimental philosophy; now we call it science". There follows a sequence that traces science back to the Ancient Greeks, then via the usual litany of astronomers – Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler, Galileo, culminating with Newton and his much-quoted assertion, "I seem to have been only like a boy playing by the seashore, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me". From there, the film goes straight to contemporary particle physics, inferring a connection between the long history of natural philosophy and contemporary science. Throughout, the film time and again returns to historical precedents, consistently to assert continuity, rather than difference as the historian would.

The second aspect of the film's characterisation of science is the emphasis on its international nature. The opening sequence, for example, features Scotland, Bombay, California, Cambridge, and an unnamed ocean. Then again, in the second half of the film, there is a sequence where the visuals are borrowed from the Alert! the Russian 1959 official film record of their contribution to the International Geophysical Year (1957–1958) [2]. International examples are presented throughout.

The third trope is the way that the film portrays science as "pure" rather than applied. The postwar period produced many overlapping terms for this: curiosity-driven, pure, fundamental, basic; all with their particular local meanings. The film is more indirect; Royal Society President, Cyril Hinshelwood, in a short piece to camera, does use the phrase "converging attacks on *fundamental problems*" but generally it is the film's whole technique that conveys its view of pure science (see below). We see science being done – scientific method at work, if you will. Certainly, all its examples are varieties of "basic" science: astronomy, particle physics, the electrical properties of plants, electroencephalography, DNA. In fact, the view of contemporary science conveyed in the film is very much in accord with the famous American postwar scientific creed enunciated in Vannevar Bush's 1945 statement, *Science the Endless Frontier*, which Roger Pielke has called "the beginning of modern science policy". Bush wrote: "Scientific progress on a broad front results from the free play of free intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in the manner dictated by their curiosity for exploration of the unknown" [3–5].

That's what you also see in the film.

A Light in Nature and the Royal Society's Public Relations in 1960

The tercentenary was a major part of determined attempts by Hinshelwood, President since 1955, to turn the Society somewhat away from its well-known elitism and aloofness and to become more outward-looking. He sought to portray the Society as sitting at the centre of both the global scientific community and of the British establishment. The film's internationalism was very much in tune with the postwar spirit of the society; as Peter Collins has argued:

"Over a period of about two decades, from the mid-1950s to about the mid-1970s, it became common wisdom that aspects of international science and aspects of foreign policy were or could be interlinked to mutual advantage. By the same token, it became clear that science was too important to be left to the whim of consenting scientists. International science had to accommodate the exigencies of international politics, just as international politics had to accommodate the process and progress of science" [6, p. 155].

But the archive reveals that Shell approached the Royal Society with the offer of a film, not that the Society commissioned the film from Shell. Shell's motivation is patent. The gala's leaflet, produced by Shell, gives their reasoning: "In these fundamental sciences technological industry is based The Tercentenary of the Royal Society cannot pass, therefore, without industry's acknowledging the value of this heritage. It is still the unclouded inspiration of the laboratories where natural knowledge is pursued for its own sake".

And then it makes the link, and the case: "just as industry interprets their findings to the world by practical applications, so it may be an appropriate compliment on this occasion [for industry] to offer an interpretation of science's processes and thought and of the position it occupies on the frontiers of knowledge today".

The film makes the argument for "curiosity-led" science, but for Shell, that leaves the field clear for industrial companies such as their own to pursue its application. As a multinational company, it was in their interests to support fundamental science, at the same time that their wealth as a company enabled them to fund the production of such an expensive film to promote their view, and their distributed international operation gave them access to sites across the world for filming. Science is international not simply because, as the film says, its method is eternal and it occurs across the world, but because it is also part of international business.

How the Film Works

It is worth considering the style of the film, that is how it puts across its account of science. *A Light in Nature* is very much a "prestige" documentary, a high-status form, where extra expenditure was made for the sake of the subject's perceived importance: on high production values, music, international shooting, archive. The film uses the "impressionistic" style of documentary filmmaking to create an emotional response in the audience, rather than an explicit structured argument. Its impression is created by a combination of the quality of the camerawork, the pace and style of the editing, and the composition of the soundtrack, and a generous length of 35 minutes. The sonic elements are particularly significant in this film, perhaps more important than the visuals. The decision to spend significantly on composer (Humphrey Searle), conductor and orchestra for a bespoke musical score is evidently hugely impactful on the film's effectiveness. Furthermore, the tone of the commentary – male, authoritative, informative and non-continuous – has real impact. The words spoken are in the "poetic" documentary style, an established genre generally traced back to WH Auden's contributions to the 1936 film, *Night Mail*. In *A Light in Nature*, the very grammar and texture of the words create a collage of assertions that, rather than presenting a structured argument, gesture to particular interpretations, but in a way that is rarely explicit. At the end of a film using such a collage technique, I think the audience member would be excused for feeling that they'd had an agreeable experience without being able to recall very much about what it says.

Conclusions

It is clear that in the postwar period, when science was truly coming into its own as a major force in the world economy and international relations, it was necessary for scientific organisations to develop public relations practice to a greater extent than before. And in an era in which for many people the power of science was defined by the Atom Bomb, the way in which science was represented in public was important. What science was that it could produce such dramatic effects led to the need to represent it, but with care. Many organisations and individuals were keen to do this work; not just the Shell oil company, but also the BBC and the Science Museum, to mention a couple that I've studied.

The AHRC – RFBR conference brought together several varieties of history. My own sub-discipline, the History of Science, is a humanities discipline that really emerged in the 1960s. As the film A Light in Nature has grown old, my discipline has grown up, and its study of science as a social and cultural phenomenon would provide any current day film producer with a much wider range of narratives than were available to Ramsay Short and the Shell Film Unit nearly 60 years ago. Certainly, my disciplinary colleagues would argue:

– Whereas the film presents natural philosophy as the same as science, modern technoscience is really radically different from the Baconianism of the early Royal Society, and that we wouldn't want them to be the same;

– Equally, whilst science's internationalism is of great interest, there is as much scholarly interest in what makes scientific practice distinct at the local level;

– At the same time, science is generally seen as rarely "pure", but as deeply imbricated in application, practice and human values, rather than being a value-free pursuit of abstract knowledge with application as its separate sequel.

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The Cold War in Museums: Using Artefacts to Tell Twentieth-Century History

Холодная война в экспозициях музеев: использование музейных коллекций, отражающих историю XX века

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In 1964, personnel at the American Submarine base at the Holy Loch registered a Polaris Military tartan. Its background is navy blue and dark green to represent the naval uniform and the depths of the oceans; it has Royal blue and gold over-checks for the alternating "Blue" and "Gold" crews. National Museums Scotland (NMS) seeks to collect this fabric to evidence the complex legacy of the Cold War: one artefact exhibiting a global phenomenon manifested locally, a blend of military and civilian, art and technology.

These roundtable meetings have vividly shown the long and varied history of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia. Never perhaps has the connection between the countries been so charged as the chill, four-decade deadlock of the Cold War, which has a large and sophisticated associated scholarship. It impacted on the lives of all who lived through it in both nations, and yet as generations emerge with no memory of it, the public history of the Cold War is uneven.

The Cold War poses particular challenges for heritage practitioners, not least because in Europe and North America, although the Cold War never turned hot. It was a complex phenomenon – an "imaginary war", part high politics, part local endeavour. This makes it difficult to represent in museums, and it has a lower profile public history profile than the two World Wars (especially the Great War after four years of centennial commemoration). This is not necessarily through lack of collections, but rather because of the contested nature of the Cold War, the lack of simple narratives, and insufficient inter-disciplinary joining-the-dots. The World Wars abound with stories of heroism, sacrifice and victimhood for museums to display; the Cold War's material cultures are more ambiguous. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in a climate of renewed global tension, museums are planning to develop or re-develop their public offer for the generation who did not live through the conflict and to capture the experience of those who did.

At NMS we are working with University of Stirling as well as heritage and university partners in the UK and beyond to analyse how museums have told Cold War stories. This will help us to evaluate how museum objects can be used to display recent history, and more broadly to understand the use of things in historical research and engagement: *material historiography*.

In the UK, the current heritage offer includes the Imperial War Museums at Duxford, the National Cold War Exhibition at Cosford (part of Royal Air Force Museums) and the National Museum of Flight near Edinburgh, one of National Museums Scotland's sites (*fig. 1*). For the most part, the Cold War is experienced via large technology, for example with the powerful materiality of the V-Force Bombers. Likewise in Russia Federation, models of the "Joe-1" Soviet atomic bomb on display in several sites round Moscow offer a particular perspective on

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Fig. 1. Avro Vulcan Bomber B.2 XM597, 1963, on display at the National Museum of Flight. National Museums Scotland T.1984.47.1.

the conflict. And in both countries, less formal heritage offers may be found in subterranean sites such as "Scotland's Secret Bunker" in Fife or "Bunker-42" in suburban Moscow. They seek more overtly to capture the anxiety induced by the prospect of nuclear attack.

The material culture of the Cold War is not however limited to bunkers and bombers. The stuff of civil readiness, art, domestic life, peace and protest is sometimes on display – including for example the V&A's *Cold War Design* (2008–2009). More often these items can be found in museum depots or stores. Available for research use, these "reserve" collections quantitatively outnumber the material on display many times over. To appreciate the potential for material culture to help us understand the Cold War (or any other historical phenomenon) we can and should turn to these other collections, the iceberg below the surface.

At NMS, for example, the National Museums Collections Centre houses a collection of memorabilia donated by Scottish peace campaigner Kristin Barrett (*fig. 2*). Collaborative doctoral student Sarah Harper is working with me alongside Professors Holger Nehring and Siân Jones of the University of Stirling, using this and other material to tell the story of the Cold War in Scotland. Nuclear disarmament badges can reveal the impact of the conflict on everyday life and the specific local narratives, such as the 1982 Peace March Scotland.

Fig. 2. An improvised rattle from 1982 donated by Scottish peace campaigner of Kristin Barrett. Photograph by Sarah Harper; National Museums Scotland X.2019.366.

We can juxtapose this with other collections evidencing the Cold War in other walks of life: chemical suits and hand-weapons in the military collections; the entire contents of a Royal Observer Crops bunker to evidence Civil Defence; Soviet memorabilia in the Art & Design collections; covert audio devices in the Communication Technology collection; Rocketry and computing in the Science collection; material evidencing civil and military development of nuclear power at the Dounreay (part of the growing field of "Nuclear Cultural heritage"). They are supported by extensive multi-media assets: oral histories, film, photographs and print paraphernalia. Other institutions on both sides of the Iron Curtain have just as rich inter-disciplinary collections if we go looking for them. Combining them gives us a wider, more nuanced history of the experience

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of this global phenomenon beyond high politics and the military-industrial complex that dominate our understanding of the relationship between Britain and Russia.

The University of Stirling and National Museums Scotland have a collaborative research programme in development to interrogate these objects and their collections; how they are and could be displayed; and how museums visitors respond to them. This will promote knowledge transfer between higher education and heritage sectors using material culture. We aim to enrich the historiography of the later twentieth century history using previously under-valued material culture, and in turn to bring a broader Cold War history to bear in museums.

Empire and Modernization: Russia before 1917

Империя и модернизация: Россия до 1917 года

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The Russian state had expanded very rapidly during the nineteenth century. Muscovy had been extending its boundaries since the fifteenth century and Peter the Great took a conscious decision to accelerate the process of Russian expansion and to direct Russian energies westwards. During the 1790s the partitions of Poland had brought most of the Polish state under Russian control, and in 1809 victory in war with Sweden resulted in Finland becoming part of the Russian empire. In the south, Russia attempted to gain control of the Caucasus, but this proved to be a challenging process. Rivalry with Persia continued during the first years of the nineteenth century, with military conflict between the two that continued into the 1820s. Gaining control of the whole region proved to be a prolonged and costly process: during the 1830s and 1840s the Russian army was engaged in almost continual conflicts to subdue the peoples of the Caucasus and it suffered significant casualties. The struggle continued into the middle of the century, with Russia making a renewed effort to conquer the region at the end of the 1850s. In 1858, Shamil, the leader of the Caucasian forces, was captured but it still took Russia another six years to achieve a degree of stability in the Caucasus and, when Alexander II visited Dagestan in 1871, he had to be accompanied by a formidable set of bodyguards.

It was Central Asia, however, that witnessed the greatest expansion of Russian power. Some of the Kazakh peoples had accepted Russian overlordship during the eighteenth century, and from the 1830s onwards Russia made a concerted effort to extend its power southwards towards Persia and Afghanistan. Progress was spasmodic during the middle years of the century, with revolts against the Russians at the end of the 1830s, but in the 1860s, Russia adopted a much more assertive policy in Central Asia, sending expeditions that succeeded in taking Tashkent in 1865 and Samarkand in 1868. A governor-generalship was set up in Tashkent, showing the determination of Russia to establish its authority across the region and further military activity brought agreement with the Khan of Bukhara in 1868, the surrender of Khiva in 1873 and the annexation of Kokand in 1876. By the end of the 1870s, Russian domination of Central Asia was secure and Russia had established itself as a major imperial power in the region. Further east, Russia's position on the Pacific coast strengthened as expeditions explored the lower reaches of the Amur, reaching its mouth in 1849 and establishing a Russian fortification there. Russian imperial expansion during the nineteenth century was both rapid and deliberate: scientists, military men and diplomats all understood the benefits of extending the reach of Russian power. The Tsarist regime displayed great dynamism in expanding its political authority, especially in the difficult areas of Central Asia. Successive rulers gave their approval to the demonstration of Russian power that was evident as Russian troops planted the flag in parts of Asia thousands of kilometres from the St. Petersburg capital. By the mid-1870s, Russia's empire was more or less complete and Russian power straddled both Asia and Europe.

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The expansion of the Russian empire never required Russians to venture overseas. Instead, Russian explorers and troops gradually made their way across the Eurasian landmass, adding new territory to the metropolitan state itself. This distinguished the Tsarist empire from some of its European counterparts and presented the St Petersburg regime with significant challenges. The growing empire and its nature posed important questions about the nature of this dynamic Russian state: was it an empire that was Russian in every way, or was it just a group of disparate lands and peoples that were ruled from St Petersburg by Russians?

Russia's imperial ambitions were a crucial element in the development of its relations with foreign powers. As Russian influence grew in Central Asia, tensions grew in Russia's relations with Britain, with the London government mindful of the potential threat posed by Russia to its Indian empire. Some ambitious Russian military men genuinely believed that Russia was in a position to strike at British India, even though the government itself was much more cautious in its approach. Nevertheless, the extension of Russian power in Asia in the 1860s and 1870s caused disquiet in Britain and set the two European powers with the greatest stake in Asia at odds with each other. This tension between Britain and Russia had important consequences for international relations in Europe itself. The two countries had been allies in the war against Napoleon at the start of the nineteenth century, but disagreement as the Ottoman empire weakened in following decades led to open war in the Crimea in the 1850s, with the British, French and Turks inflicting a humiliating defeat on Russia on its own soil. This intensified the rivalry between Britain and Russia in Asia, but it also continued the suspicion that existed between the two powers in other fields. The deeply conservative regime of Nicholas I (1825–1855) gained the soubriquet of being the "gendarme of Europe" as it acted to put down rebellions, most notably in 1830 and 1848, and even after the accession of the reform-minded Alexander II Russia remained firmly on the side of the established order in Europe. By the 1880s, however, Bismarck's Germany had ended its alliance with Russia and the Tsarist regime found itself friendless. Russia was able, however, to strike an accord with France, ostensibly an unlikely ally given French republicanism, but which made sense after France's defeat by Prussia in 1871. There were powerful economic reasons for a Franco-Russian alliance: Sergei Witte, the Russian Minister of Finance, was determined to revitalise the Russian economy but Russia itself could not generate sufficient capital for investment in new industries. Foreign investment was, therefore, vital if Russia was to make economic progress and France promised to be a fruitful source of capital. Neither Germany nor Britain was prepared to play any major part in providing loans to Russia: the Germans were wary of the Russian rapprochement with France, while the British mistrust of Russia's Asian ambitions meant that British banks maintained their distance from Russia. In 1907, however, both Britain and Russia recognised that tensions in Asia were unproductive and concluded an agreement to resolve their disagreements in Afghanistan, Persia and Tibet. Imperial ambition in the Far East prompted the development of an assertive foreign policy towards Japan around the turn of the twentieth century: Nicholas II (1894–1917) was prepared to countenance war, believing that Russia would emerge victorious against a small Asian state. The Japanese, however, inflicted a crushing defeat on Russia on both land and sea in the war of 1904–1905, leaving Russia's military reputation shattered. The expansion of Russia's empire played a major part in shaping the Tsarist state's foreign policy, but Russia's international relations rested on increasingly shaky ground as the nineteenth century advanced.

In 1814, Russian military and political power reached unparalleled heights. Tsar Alexander I's armies had played a major part in the defeat of Napoleon, driving the French from Russia in 1812 and pushing westwards in 1813 and 1814, so that the Tsar was able to march his troops into Paris in March 1814. In the course of a century, Russia had been transformed from a position of regional strength in northern Europe into one of the Great Powers, able to vanquish France. But Russia was never able to repeat the scale of its military triumph against Napoleon under the Tsarist regime. While Russian armies were able to win victories in limited conflicts, such as against Persia in the late 1820s and against the Ottoman empire in 1877–1878, Tsarist forces suffered severe defeats in the Crimea (1854–1856) and in the Far East against Japan (1904–1905). Even when Russia was able to achieve military success, such as during the Russo-Turkish war in the 1870s, the diplomatic settlement that followed at the Congress of Berlin saw the other European powers place severe limits on the growth of Russian power. Defeat in the 1850s, and again a half century later against Japan were traumatic for the Russian state. Military power was a central pillar in legitimising the Romanov regime's autocratic rule of its empire, and defeat provoked intense reflection about the nature of the Russian regime. Both the Crimean catastrophe and defeat by Japan came after sustained periods of deeply conservative rule, when Nicholas I, Alexander III and Nicholas II had each resisted calls for domestic reform. Both defeats were followed by intense pressure for reform at home, as reformers sought to take advantage of the obvious weakness of the Tsarist regime. Alexander II's "great reforms" and the constitutional changes of 1905 were each prompted by the belief that Russia could only recover its military prowess – and its wider international position – by modernising its internal political and social structures. The link between domestic policy and international prestige was very plain to Russians: while the Tsarist state appeared able to advance its imperial agenda and bring new lands under the control of St Petersburg, domestic opinion maintained a grudging acceptance of the conservatism of Russia's rulers. International humiliation, however, released a pent-up discontent with Tsarism and struck at the heart of Russian domestic power.

The Russian state paid a high price for its empire. The acquisition and maintenance of its imperial possessions required a large army and, by the end of the nineteenth century, Russia was spending nearly a quarter of its national budget on the military. It was military expenditure that dominated Russia's state finances. During the eighteenth century, the army and navy consistently accounted for some 40 per cent of the Russian state's spending and, at times, almost 60 per cent of the budget was devoted to military expenditure. This is hardly surprising, given Russia's persistent involvement in wars and the continuing impetus to extend the territorial boundaries of the empire. Military expenditure grew significantly during times of war, with sharp increases during the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1878–1879. There was also a considerable increase in military spending in the years preceding the First World War, with expenditure growing from 420 million rubles in 1900 to 820 million rubles in 1913. Although this did not represent a significant increase in the proportion of the government's income devoted to military spending, since the state's budget was growing rapidly during this period, it was a much heavier burden that at first appears. By 1914, Russian military expenditure exceeded that of Britain, even though Britain's army and navy were needed to protect the security of its far-flung empire. It has been suggested that the proportion of Russia's national income devoted to military expenditure was almost twice as heavy as for the more economically developed countries of Britain, France and Germany.

This severely reduced the amount of revenue that could be utilised for other elements of the state's activities, so that Russia continued to lag behind its European rivals in areas such as the provision of education. The pursuit of its imperial ambitions reinforced the Petrine emphasis on Russia as a Great Power, but it meant that the Tsarist state was able only sporadically to follow the second part of Peter the Great's programme – economic and social modernization. The rapid expansion of the Russian empire during the nineteenth century skewed the balance of the state's concerns away from domestic policy towards its wider international position and it was only at times of crisis, such as in the 1850s and in 1905, that domestic concerns took temporary and short-lived primacy.

Gatekeeping Russianness: Cultural Entrepreneurship and Identity Negotiation in the UK's Russophone Communities

Охранительство русскости: культурное предпринимательство и переговоры об идентичности в русскофонных сообществах Великобритании

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The paper reports on one of the strands of my AHRC-funded Open World Research Initiative (OWRI) project entitled "Global Russians: Transnational Russophone Networks in the UK". The project is based on ethnographic fieldwork that has collected over 150 hours of recorded interview narratives of leaders of Russophone cultural entrepreneurship in the United Kingdom. Using a discourse studies approach I examine how these leaders talk about their transnational selves and cultural activism and how this talk shapes the imagination of the Russophone community in the UK.

The paper draws on the theory of linguistic commodification which posits that in the current stage of the globalised economy, the traditional link between language, territory and cultural and national identities (the discourse of "pride") has weakened, while language is recast as a commodifiable manifestation of economic value (the discourse of "profit") [1, 2]. The paper sets out to investigate to what extent the discourses of Russian linguo-cultural identity and community are susceptible to commodification, and if so, what discursive elements of the narrative of identity are used as a resource of "profit".

The focus of the paper is a case study of Nikolai (not the real name), a London-based diasporic leader who guides tours around London in Russian. With a thriving business with an earning potential of around £800 a day, Nikolai offers 40 various London tours to the Russian speaking public, each tour attracting at least 25 people. Nikolai is well known among Russian speakers not only across the UK but also in Russia and many other countries with Russian-speaking minorities.

The paper examines two discourses produced by Nikolai – his talk during my interview with him taken on 23 October 2017 (1 hour 20 mins) and a recording of his "Jack the Ripper" excursion around London's Whitechapel on 21 October 2017, (1 hour 33 mins). Nikolai's narratives have been interrogated with the following questions in mind:

– In order to achieve success in his tour guiding business, what are the discursive tools that Nikolai employs for attracting Russian-speaking public to his excursions and mobilizing them for consumption of his tours?

– How do these tools relate to his imagination of the Russian-speaking community sharing common linguo-cultural identity?

Popular London sights packaged as a commodity for Russian-speaking tourists and migrants can be seen from two perspectives. On the one hand, the source culture, that is, the British cultural and historical heritage is used in the tourist business as a commercial product for tourists' consumption. On the other hand, a potential for being a commodity is also

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embedded in the role of the receptor language and culture, in our case, Russian. Language has an ability to "[act] as a semiotic marker for a specific quality that is projected onto a specific product, knowledge, or service, and [act] as a source of added value" [3, p. 59]. Therefore, any specific linguistic code and element may be employed for marketing a commodity and to attribute to it a specific value.

The analysis concludes that much of the commercial success of Nikolai's tour guiding business lies in his narratives, constructing the commodified variant of a Russian speaking identity and community. The paper points out that in his interview narrative, Nikolai frames his excursions not so much as an occasion of spreading and acquiring knowledge about London sites, but as an excuse and an opportunity for Russophones for meeting people and socialising (Nikolai talks about them as "общение" and "повод встретиться"). He constructs a community of his customers and followers around the semantics of conviviality and cosmopolitanism, for example, by using the familiar register and calling his customers "ребята" (guys), and navigating the spatial scale when he imagines his community as globally stretched rather than local or UK-wide.

Nikolai's tour of Whitechapel is a complex discursive work in which spatialization [4] – the transformation of space to indicate a particular position in discourse – takes prominence. Telling stories in Russian about Whitechapel murders, Nikolai presents space dynamically, domesticating London not only linguistically but also culturally. For example, the layout of the houses, orchards and toilet arrangements in the nineteenth century Whitechapel are compared with Soviet dachas. The London news agency of the 1880s is recast as the current Russia's news agency Itar-TASS, the Whitechapel slums are explained through references to the Soviet apartment blocks and the British TV series called "Whitechapel" is compared with the Russian sixteen season television hit "Улица разбитых фонарей" ("The street with the smashed lights"). Thus, London spaces are discursively turned into hybrid bicultural zones imbued with elements of Russian linguo-cultural localisation.

Yet, Russian cultural knowledge that Nikolai employs to build a shared identity is recognizable but is neither nostalgic nor necessarily experienced by many in his group. His Russian cultural glue is anchored in a most general scale of common experience and a high level of accessibility – the everyday, the pop and media culture which are as fleeting as the customers' memories themselves. It seems that the tour guide relies more on the symbolic, prosthetic Russianness, which is easily extractable from its locality, and as it is transposed to London sites, accepts a kind of trans-national universality.

The established sense of convivial Russophone community and the acceptance of the offered identity are indicated by the customers' communicative engagement, laughter and importantly bookings for the next tour, proving to be successful tools of commodification.

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The People's Will: Direct and Representative Democracy in the Russian Imagination, 1844 to the Present

Воля народа: прямая и представительная демократия в русском воображении с 1844 года до наших дней

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This presentation explored Russia attitudes to forms of democracy by considering seven Anglo-Russian political encounters – from the visit of Nicholas I to the Palace of Westminster in 1844 to Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United Kingdom in December 1984. The Anglo-Russian approach allows us to pull together two cases often viewed as exceptional. On the one hand, Russia: by some measures the least parliamentary European country, the most defiant old regime in Europe until 1917 and a one-party regime for much of the twentieth century. On the other hand, Britain: a country for whom parliamentary democracy is absolutely at the heart of its modern identity.

Even if these countries do represent opposite extremes, they have taken a good deal of interest in each other. Perhaps the most surprising example is Nicholas I. Often viewed as one of the most autocratic of tsars, who was just about to crush the merest suspicion of dissent in his empire in the wake of 1848, Nicholas I was deeply impressed by the reconstruction of Palace of Westminster under Charles Barry when he visited in 1844. This was a far cry from his apparently less favourable observations of British political system on his visit as heir in 1816–1817.

At this point two obvious qualifications are in order. First, England could always be presented as a special case. After all, Russia's most notorious conservative of the later nineteenth century, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, was an Anglophile. But like any good conservative, he believed that forms of government evolved along with the societies in which they operated. What was sauce for the English goose was most definitely not sauce for the Russian gander. The second qualification is that Nicholas I was impressed more by the grandeur of the building as a symbol of British state power than by the finer points of the British constitution. He had just overseen a major reconstruction project of his own in the Winter Palace, rebuilt in record time after it burned down in 1837: he understood how important powerful buildings are.

It would, of course, be foolish to deny the existence of a strong anti-parliamentary trend in Russian intellectual life. One maverick representative of the tradition was Lev Tolstoy, our second example, who paid a brief visit to the House of Commons to hear a debate on his visit to London in 1861 and seems to have been unimpressed by what he saw and heard. Tolstoy, as would become ever clearer later in his life, had little time for any kind of structured political life.

The Slavophile alternative to Western representative democracy was the direct grass-roots democracy of the Russian peasant commune. This institution had its admirers even outside Russia. Our third Anglo-Russian example is the account left by Donald Mackenzie Wallace, a long-term visitor to Russia in the 1870s, who found village communes to be "capital specimens of representative Constitutional government

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of the extreme democratic type". Wallace was in Russia at a moment of significant political innovation: the 1860s–70s saw more vigorous elections to newly constituted municipal dumas; elections to the all-estate body of the zemstvo; the populists' quest for the people, which culminated in the decision in the late 1870s by one section of the movement that the people could best be represented by acts of revolutionary terror; and a good deal of discussion, in government circles and beyond, about the possibility of an authentically Russian consultative assembly of the land.

In 1906, Russia would finally get its own parliament, the State Duma, which opened whole new vistas for Anglo-Russian political exchange. Perhaps the most distinguished and active participant was Bernard Pares, our fourth example, the founder of Russian Studies in Britain, who visited Russia frequently from 1904 onwards, leaving wonderful accounts of the 1905 revolution and early Duma period, as well as hosting a delegation of Russian parliamentarians in London in 1909. Pares took a notably favourable view of the Duma: its Nakaz (rules of order), for example, was "so good that in all the subsequent vicissitudes of the Duma, including the changes of majority, it was never seriously altered. Anyone who read it through would have said that, if this was the order of things in Russia, then Russia was already a constitutional state".

In Russia, nonetheless, all through the Duma period there remained powerful critics of parliamentary politics. One was N.N. Shipov, our fifth example, who in a 1908 pamphlet launched a coruscating critique of Britain's "despotic" parliamentary rule. Shipov ran through a classic set of anti-parliamentary and Slavophile arguments: that parliamentary authority is underwritten by a corrupt and partisan press; that places in parliament are secured by special interests through meretricious electioneering; and that government by parliamentary majority is capricious and far from rational. To this he counterposed Russia's more organic political community and "rule by conscience".

As a member of the monarchist Russian Assembly, Shipov was perfectly representative of the right-wing attitude to parliaments, and indeed the Rightists in the Duma did everything they could to subvert the institution. But the essence of their anti-parliamentary critique would soon be taken up by a radical leftist regime. The Bolsheviks had no time for bourgeois "talking shops", which they viewed as expressing the vested interests of the bourgeoisie rather than representing the people.

My sixth example is an early Soviet visitor to the British parliament. In 1924, the Soviet stenographer V. Ostroumova was invited on tour of Houses of Parliament by the Labour politician George Lansbury. Ostroumova was struck by the fact that her British counterparts were older (rarely under 35), all male, and with journalistic experience rather than proper stenographic training. She concluded that stenography in the Palace of Westminster was much more about providing good copy for the newspapers, presumably with a suitable political gloss, than with producing an accurate record. Paradoxically, she saw the USSR as taking the public sphere of the stenographic transcript more seriously than the British.

Here we have another example of a foreign observer finding their preconceptions confirmed. But we should also recognize that central to the Bolshevik self-image was a certain notion of the public sphere, of mass popular participation, and of democracy. These ideas reached their symbolic fulfilment in the Stalin constitution of 1936 and the first universal suffrage elections in the USSR – to the Supreme Soviet in 1937. Never mind that this was election by acclamation or that hundreds of thousands of people who might have been tempted to vote the wrong way were being shot at the time.

This begs the question: is that all there is to be said about representative democracy in the Soviet period? Did it become nothing more than a hollowed-out ritual dependent on coercion? At least in the post-Stalin era, I think, the situation was a little more nuanced. A small clue is provided by my final example, Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to London in 1984. The occasion is mainly remembered for the rapport that Gorbachev established with Margaret Thatcher, but it is worth remembering that it took place as the latest in a series of reciprocal "parliamentary" visits. In the mid-1950s, the USSR had been admitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and it became important for the rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet to establish its credentials as a "people's parliament". Gorbachev, as we know, was increasingly an admirer of Western European social democracy, and along with that came a willingness to espouse deliberative politics along parliamentary lines. But, as a largely ceremonial participant in Western deliberative politics, he seems to have underestimated just how obstreperous parliaments could be. It is hard otherwise to understand how he could have imagined that his extraordinarily bold move of convoking a Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 would make it easier for him to steer the country along his new course.

These seven Anglo-Russian encounters suggest that we should not succumb to Russian exceptionalism (or indeed to British exceptionalism) but think comparatively and connectedly. The modern world, from 1789 onwards, was asking itself searching questions about the nature, value and purpose of political representation. Russia's rulers may have seen themselves as the last bastion against 1789-style radicalism or 1848-style liberalism, but they were not by any means oblivious to the imperative for politics to be, at least on the symbolic level, of the people. And they were constantly positioning themselves politically relative to others – including the British, but by no means only the British. They were also operating at a time of vastly expanded means of symbolic expression – above all the press in the late nineteenth century and the audiovisual media in the twentieth.

Finally, let us remember that democracy is not just about institutional arrangements but also about practices (such as voting), about the symbolic relationship between rulers and ruled and about imagined political tradition; it is a question of identity. By now the Russian imagination has plenty to work with, not least the Tauride Palace, the ultimate lieu de mémoire, home of Russia's main experiments in both representative democracy (the Duma) and direct democracy (the Soviet) and now home of Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The post-1906 Duma is now attracting far more sustained and favourable attention than alternative points of reference – notably the direct democracy of the Petrograd Soviet – and gaining the status of a usable past.

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Russian Collections at the British Library as Information Resource and Cultural Experience: Past, Present, Future

Русские коллекции в Британской библиотеке как информационный ресурс и культурный опыт: прошлое, настоящее, будущее

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ведущий куратор восточноевропейских коллекций, Британская библиотека

The first fifteen books published in Russia were acquired by the British Museum as part of the private collection of Sir Hans Sloane (1660–1753), who was an honorary member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Some Russian and Slavonic books were in the Library of King George III, donated to the British Museum in 1823. However, foreign books and periodicals could not be collected systematically not only because scholarly interest in them was almost non-existent, but also due to lack of financial resources and linguistic skills.

By the end of the 19th century the situation had considerably improved. In 1837, Antonio Panizzi (1797–1879) became Keeper of Printed Books. He held this post till 1856 and for the following ten years served as Principal Librarian. Panizzi and his assistant Thomas Watts (1811–1869), a talented linguist and polyglot, became instrumental in reforming collection development in the Library. Command of Russian, other Slavonic, Scandinavian or other rare languages was a rarity in 19th century Britain, as tuition was not available. Watts taught himself languages by intensive reading, and before joining the Library on payroll had been helping to catalogue foreign language material on a voluntary basis. Having compared the British Museum Library holdings of foreign material with sales catalogues and bibliographies originated in the countries of origin, Panizzi presented these findings to a Parliamentary Committee in 1846, and as a result of this the allowance given to the Library for purchasing materials was raised from four and a half to ten thousand pounds. Thus, Panizzi's and Watts's ambitions to create best collections of foreign materials outside the country of origin (e.g. the best Russian collection outside Russia) resulted in building one of the most important research resources in the UK and the world that responded to the growing interest in Russia, but also shaped and informed this interest, as well as the future scholarship in the Russian Studies in the UK.

From the middle of the 19th century to nowadays various trends in the acquisition patterns and collection development were linked to a number of internal and external factors, such as staff's personal interests (or lack of it) in the subjects and languages, the general political and economic situation in Britain and abroad, and trends in British foreign policy. For example, after Great Britain had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1924 following a long break caused by the October revolution of 1917, Slavonic studies started to emerge as a popular academic discipline which also influenced collection development. The Cold War and later *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* in the USSR and the velvet revolutions in Central Europe also catalysed scholarly activities in the field of

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Russian and Soviet studies which consequently had a significant impact on the Russian, Slavonic and East European collections.

At the end of the 19th century the Russian émigré community in London played an active part in advising and suggesting material for the Russian collections, as they used and shaped the collections. Prince Petr Kropotkin and Vladimir Burtsev wrote lengthy letters to the Museum authorities supplied with desiderata lists, while many others, including V. Lenin, donated books to the Library. The Russians (or Russian speakers) who lived in Britain and used the British Museum Library "appropriated" the Russian collections and were happy to share with the British Museum staff their knowledge of the culture and the book market, as well as their passion for the collections and responsibilities for its growth. I would argue that the Russian collections at the British Museum Library could be discussed in the framework of cultural heritage which will help us to understand the role of national cultural institutions in the UK in collecting and curating foreign cultural heritage.

At present the depths and breadths of the Russian collections at the British Library could be summarised as the following list of highlights:

– over 70 Old Slavonic manuscripts and 88 early printed (16–17th century) Slavonic books;

– rare 18th and 19th century Russian books and periodicals;

– comprehensive collection of Russian 19th century publications;

– fairly full collection of Russian émigré publications;

– one of the best collections outside Russia of Avant-garde books;

– a representative collection of original posters;

– general collection of modern printed books;

– special collection of independent Russian press of the post-Soviet period;

– newspapers, maps, sound recordings, electronic databases, archives on microfilms.

The future of the collections is not only in continuing to acquire the most important print outputs in the Russian language produced in the Russian Federation and globally, but also by providing access to full-text databases of archives and periodicals, connecting to free online resources, and creating research resources and collections. For example, the British Library records selected TV programmes, including RT, which are available for the readers. Another example of shaping the future is *Russian in the UK Collection* in the UK Web Archive, which is being done by a Collaborative Doctoral PhD student supported by AHRC. We aspire to document the process of creation a special collection reflecting simultaneously on the research potential of the resource and identifying the discourse where such a collection could work for researchers in our area and the Russian speaking community, as this project also aims to preserve its digital heritage. The transition that we are making "from documents to data" is unique. It gives a wide range of options to design and describe collections.

Studying the Russian collections gives us knowledge and understanding of various historic and theoretical issues, including the British society, UK – Russia relations, or the role of cultural institutions in preserving cultural heritage of various communities.

What is Heritage? British and Russian Questions and Answers

Что такое наследие? Британские и русские вопросы и ответы

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This paper drew on research for an AHRC-sponsored project on national identity (Russian National Identity: Traditions and Deterritorialisation, 2007–2011) and an AHRC Fellowship on the Russian cinema (The Soviet Cine-Underground: Lenfil'm (the Leningrad State Film Studio) and the Transformation of Late Soviet Culture, 1956–1991, 2015–2017), and on the publications resulting [1–4]. Its purpose was to examine the political and social history of heritage preservation, and in particular, the implicit hierarchies of value that have led individual works of art, and sometimes entire art forms, to be classified as marginal in heritage terms.

For different reasons, architecture and cinema had a less secure place in the heritage canons of Russia / the Soviet Union and Britain during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than, say, literature, painting, classical music, or theatre and performance arts. Both in Britain and in the USSR, architectural heritage was subject throughout the late nineteenth century, and during the decades after the First World War, to neglect and at times aggressive intervention (the infamous demolitions of churches in Russia during the 1920s and 1930s were not only a reflection of the state commitment to radical atheism, but of a city planning ethos that had also fostered the destruction of medieval and baroque churches in nineteenth-century London) [5]. In both countries, a turning point was reached in the aftermath of the Second World War, when destruction in the wake of enemy action produced a new commitment to preservation of the past, as expressed in the RSFSR Decree on the Preservation of Architectural Monuments in 1947 and, in the United Kingdom, by the listing of architectural monuments at government level, and, in the voluntary sector, by the National Trust's transformation from an organisation focused primarily on the promotion of public ownership of landscape to one at least equally concerned with the custodianship of buildings, particularly large country houses.

Cinema, on the other hand, was originally understood as an art form of radical modernisation, and in the USSR particularly was characterised by advocacy of assaults on monuments as signifiers of the old regime (see e.g. Sergei Eisenstein's *October*, 1927, or Friedrich Ermler's *A Fragment of Empire*, 1927). However, the War changed attitudes here too: already in 1943, Eisenstein was arguing that cinema was not just an ideal medium for recording assaults on the Soviet patrimony by the Nazi invaders, but was itself part of national heritage, and from the late 1940s, the State Film Fund was transformed from a repository for film stock into a full-scale national archive of film.

In Britain, on the other hand, the British Film Institute's primary remit was and is the promotion of cinema, rather than the custodianship of national heritage, and its excursion into the custodial role (through the foundation of the Museum of the Moving Image in 1988) in fact lasted only a decade (the Museum closed in 1999 and there is currently no state museum of film art). In Britain, "heritage cinema" has tended to mean cinema as heritage than films which celebrate heritage – witness the long-standing ubiquity of literary adaptations and other movies set in the past, whether made for the big screen or for TV.

In turn, British practice, for instance the "classic serials" made by the BBC in the 1960s, starting with *The Forsyte Saga*, exercised a very significant influence when the Soviet film and TV industry took a "historical turn" in the late 1960s. *The Forsyte Saga*, hugely popular when shown on Soviet TV, was followed by large numbers of mini-series based on classic literature made by Soviet directors, which became the yardstick of "quality TV", as they had in the UK. Among particularly interesting cases of convergence were Igor Maslennikov's adaptations of *Sherlock Holmes*, with Vasily Livanov in the title role, and later shown on British as well as Soviet TV. In both countries, they were symptomatic of a whole "heritage boom" in the 1970s – 1980s – early 1990s, in which precisely the previously neglected art forms, architecture and cinema, were to be of central importance – a situation that in some respects persists to this day.

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The British Museum and the State Hermitage Museum: Collaboration, Exhibitions, Research

Британский музей и Государственный Эрмитаж: сотрудничество, выставки, исследования

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Museums are centres of soft power and the significance of history, culture and connections are part of our institutional DNA. All museums, whether large or small, share the same values and speak the same language. In Britain, as in Russia, many of our major museums and cultural institutions have suffered as a result of conflict. Around the world we see repeated examples where culture is considered a target: it is because of this that it is sometimes seen as a threat, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria or Yemen where extremist Taliban, DAESH and other Jihadist groups have sought out and attempted to eradicate figural imagery, monuments and museums celebrating national heritage and history. This is our challenge and our opportunity: leading museums have a major role to play in the vocalisation of the message that through preservation, research and dissemination we can show the world why culture matters, how it helps define who we really are, that we are stronger together, and that long-term collaboration and trust offer the best results.

The British Museum is a universal museum founded in 1753 with guaranteed free access to the collection. We have regularly re-displayed our own collections as we have re-interpreted their significance, we loan objects around the UK and internationally and showcase our entire collection online. Students and scholars research the collection in study rooms, many others engage with the museum through the public programme of events, and we mount several special exhibitions each year which allow us to explore topics or regions not represented in our own collection.

In Russia, our main partner is the State Hermitage Museum but we have also loaned a Sakha mammoth ivory model to Yakutsk in April 2015, hosted many Russian scholars at conferences at the British Museum, and worked with others on excavations or in other fields of research. Curatorial contacts between the Hermitage and the British Museum began in the nineteenth century but it is in 1935 that we have the first record of one of our staff visiting Russia for an academic conference: this was on the occasion of the Persian Art exhibition at the Hermitage and was attended by Harold James Plenderleith (1898–1997). Plenderleith worked in the Museum's Research Laboratory from 1931–1959, and spoke on his pioneering research on the authentication of Luristan and other Iranian metalwork [1]: the contorted animal imagery on these objects was also attracting attention by Russian and western European scholars within the context of defining the cultural connections and temporal and spatial boundaries of Scythian "Animal Style" and Celtic art. The conference was massive with 218 delegates from 24 countries and the programme consisted of 62 papers [2]. Plenderleith was one of a small number of

English academics who attended this conference and, although there have been several papers on the impact of the exhibition which triggered this conference [3–6], there is more to be researched into the individual and institutional relations during this period.

During the 1960s and 1970s, there were further personal contacts and exchanges. In August 1960 Richard Barnett, Keeper of the Department of Western Asiatic Antiquities (now Middle East) attended the XXVth Orientalist Congress in Moscow and then paid a visit to Dr B.B. Piotrovsky's excavations at the Urartian fortress of Karmir Blur. In return, knowing that Barnett had published a paper a decade earlier on the Urartian collection in the British Museum [7], Dr Piotrovsky corresponded about his excavations, in one case adding photographs of some of the massive store-rooms[1], and, on behalf of the Armenian SSSR, he presented a pottery jug found inside one[2]. In 1979 we loaned the Oxus Treasure to the Hermitage: this is a unique collection of mainly fifth / fourth century BC Achaemenid gold and silver items found at a site on the right bank of the Amu dar'ya (classical Oxus) in about 1877, and acquired and bequeathed to us twenty years later by another former curator, Sir Augustus Wollaston Franks.

In 1991 UNESCO organised a project designed to open areas of dialogue on the premise of the Silk Roads and from April to June dozens of Soviet and foreign academics travelled together across the five republics of Central Asia and participated in conferences and other cultural events. This was a watershed moment personally and created an opportunity for longer-term academic relationships to develop as a result. Later that year I revisited Turkmenia, spoke at conferences, and from 1992 to 2000 excavated as a co-director of a new archaeological expedition to ancient Merv. The team was fully international and included many specialists from the State Hermitage Museum, Pushkin Museum and the Institute for the History of Material Culture, St. Petersburg (Russian Academy of Sciences).

In 2014 the British Museum and State Hermitage Museum began a series of other collaborative ventures, beginning with the loan of our Ilissos sculpture to mark the 250th anniversary of the foundation of the Hermitage, and the first occasion we had loaned a Parthenon sculpture. In 2017 we opened a major special exhibition – *Scythians: warriors of ancient Siberia (fig. 1)* – to mark our part in Britain's commemoration of the centenary of the Russian Revolution. The exhibition was a huge success and opened people's eyes to the antiquity of culture on the Eurasian steppe, the achievements of the early nomads of that region, and the fabulous preservation of clothing and even food remains in "frozen tombs" at Pazyryk in the high Altai mountains. It was also an opportunity to collaborate on research, and to use the in-house scientific expertise and facilities in the Department of Scientific Research at the British Museum to answer questions we had about how some of the goldwork from the Siberian Collection of Peter the Great was made.

This has led to yet further collaboration. In November 2019 the British Museum loaned its largest ever collection of monumental stone sculptures to the Hermitage for the special exhibition on *Assyria: I founded therein my royal palace.* We are employing scientific analyses on the whole of the Oxus Treasure in preparation for a new research publication which will include comparative discussion of pieces from the Siberian Collection of Peter the Great. We are each hosting visiting curators and scientists on other research projects ranging from food residues to Urartian metalwork and textiles. The British Museum Research Board allocated funding for a new series of radiocarbon dates on samples from old excavations at the site of Oglakhty in Khakassia in order to establish a new absolute chronology for the Tashtyk culture known from the Minusinsk Basin. The site itself is the focus of a new archaeological project from the State Hermitage Museum with invited participation from the British Museum. In return, colleagues from the Hermitage and

[1] British Museum archives / Department of the Middle East / Barnett papers.

[2] British Museum Report to Trustees 16 September 1960.

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Fig. 1. *Russian culture is welcomed in Britain: the British Museum Scythians: warriors of ancient Siberia attract attention at Waterloo railway station (copyright: The British Museum).*

Pushkin Museum are invited to join British Museum staff on archaeological projects in Iraq. Together, we are also exploring further ways in which we can work together to extend our support and research in Britain, Russia and the Middle East.

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Cultural Cross-Dressings: Treasure Island and the Socialist Realist Canon

Культурный «маскарад»: «Остров сокровищ» и социалистический реалистический канон

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This paper compared a canonic British novel, RL *Stevenson's Treasure Island*, with its 1937 Soviet film musical adaptation, Vladimir Vainshtok's Ostrov sokrovishch (*fig. 1*), in order to identify some key contradictions – ideological cross-dressings – within socialist realist aesthetics. In the 1930s the *ekranizatsiia* (film adaptation) genre fell under Stalin's shadow, and directors working within it needed to tame literary texts that resisted socialist realist rigidity. In negotiating this tension, they enter a secondary conflict between the universality of Stalinism's centralizing model and the recalcitrant particularity of the concrete images in which it is incarnated.

Fig. 1. *Screen capture from Vladimir Vainshtok's "Ostrov sokrovishch"*[1].

On the face of it, the screening of literary classics facilitated the grounding of socialist realism in an organic tradition based in the nineteenth century. Socialist realist film adaptations of non-socialist realist classics exploited their position of hindsight to project the ideologies of the present into the literary past and make the original appear retrospectively to depict reality in its revolutionary development. Thus, the choice of the popular musical form for Treasure Island denotes its membership of a Stalinist film category also including Aleksandrov's legendary *Volga, Volga* (1938) and *Tsirk* (1936), and asserting the Soviet Union's ideological victory over its class enemies. Rather than re-accommodating itself to its verbal original, the film celebrates its repackaging of Stevenson's novel via three provocative gestures: the rendering of an (albeit, already popular) English classic as mass culture; the transposition of the action of the novel to an eighteenth-century Irish rebellion against British imperial oppression; and the transformation of the male hero, Jim Hawkins, into a female, Jenny Hawkins.

However, tensions arise from the clash between socialist realism's collectivist principles and cinema's reliance on subjective identification mechanisms. Whilst films like *Treasure Island* replace highly personal

[1] The picture was provided by Professor Stephen Hutchings.

moments in their source texts with stock images of shared endeavour and joyful uniformity drawn from cinematic models, these images are themselves inflected with the affective perspectival devices upon which they rely in order to make their embodiments convincing. Emotional spontaneity – the principle socialist realism attempts to overcome – becomes the means by which socialist realist texts are given cinematic authenticity. Viewers are drawn into the network of individualizing perspectives only to become, along with the characters bearing them, the implied object of an ultimate viewpoint, that of the all-seeing, all-knowing leader (Stalin), whose sudden presence is imposed, unintegrated, on the masses which must, but cannot, become the subjects of all vision and all knowledge.

Furthermore, the foregrounding of the act of transformation of Jenny into Jim – Jenny is simultaneously the Stevenson character from the English novel and its bold Soviet feminized correction – institutes a complex play of difference and identity. It identifies as exotic "others» (Irish patriots) characters who, in their embrace of political freedom, resemble "our own" Soviet revolutionaries, and as familiar "selves" (the enemies of the people lurking in our midst) alien British officers (the film was made at the symbolic peak of Stalin's terror). Each side of the self / other paradigm slides into its opposite, whether in positive or negative mode (Soviet self becomes British / Irish other; British / Irish other becomes familiar Soviet self), demonstrating the arbitrariness of Stalinist discourse, its reliance on signs ever liable to invert their meanings.

Fig. 2. The final shot of the "Ostrov Sokrovishch"[2].

The film's last moments (*fig. 2*) depict the Irish revolutionaries shown at the beginning, galloping this time not along the seashore in flight from their British imperial oppressors, but in close, victorious formation across a bridge. The panoramic shot that eventually reduces them to outline figures serves a generalizing function ("these are not just Irish revolutionaries, but progressives the world over"), whilst the crossing of the bridge serves as the final transgressive gesture – the transformation of retreat into advance. That the screen then folds back into the pages of Stevenson's classic represents a last ironic nod to the classical source which Vainshtok's highly popular movie has so pointedly undermined, even while showing deference to it.

[2] The picture was provided by Professor Stephen Hutchings.

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Tolstoy and Tolstoyans in Britain and Russia

Толстой и толстовцы в Британии и России

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Lev Tolstoy developed his Christian anarchist moral philosophy in a body of work – books, pamphlets, short stories and a novel – that he produced between 1880 and his death in 1910. This philosophy was broad-ranging – it took in vegetarianism, temperance, chastity, condemnation of private property and money, and living by one's own physical labour: but at its foundation was the principle of absolute non-resistance to evil by violence. While Tolstoy's contemporaries in the literary world were (on the whole) horrified at his turn away from literature, his later writings had a remarkable impact on groups and individuals who were disillusioned with modern industrial society and with the politics of the time. In Russia a vigorous Tolstoyan movement emerged during the 1880s, with colonies in the provinces of Smolensk, Tver, Samara, Kursk, Perm and Kiev, and with the publishing house *Posrednik* and later the Moscow vegetarian society as centres of activity. In the rest of Europe and in the USA, Tolstoyism gained dramatically in influence a decade later, in the 1890s. This presentation for the AHRC – RFBR workshop on "British and Russian Identities and Cultures in a Comparative and Cross-Cultural Perspective" explored the activities, networks and influence of Tolstoy's followers in Britain in the 1890s and 1900s. There were collectives or enterprises run by Tolstoyans in Croydon, Essex, Derby, Manchester, Blackburn, and smaller groups elsewhere too. Studying these groups helps us to understand the different reformist contexts into which Tolstoy's ideas fit, and the diverse ways in which they were interpreted, as well as the international connections that helped Tolstoyans to build a sense of momentum in their movement.

The remarkable increase in overseas engagement with Tolstoy's Christian anarchism is apparent in the volume and content of letters received by Tolstoy from correspondents across Europe and the United States from the 1890s onwards. While it is possible to read everything that Tolstoy wrote to his correspondents in the 90 volume edition of his collected works, the letters written to him, which contain details of enterprises set up, publications produced, and conundrums faced by Tolstoyans internationally are all held in the archives of the Tolstoy Museum in Moscow. Tolstoy himself played an important role in the establishment of international Tolstoyan networks (however much he disliked the idea of a movement that followed him). He put sympathisers who wrote to him in touch with their nearest local centre of activity, and put these centres in touch with each other, supplying addresses and recommending newspapers and literature. Through the exchange of literature, correspondence and occasionally visits, these networks came to operate under their own steam (*fig. 1*). Newspapers played an important role in this, printing readers' letters and running columns on sympathetic international enterprises, whether in the Netherlands, Hungary, or the USA. Accounts of Tolstoyan conversion or enlightenment, or examplars such as the refusal of military service, were printed in Tolstoyan newspapers in multiple countries and languages.

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LONDON TOLSTOYAN SOCIETY.

Meetings Every Sunday at 7 p.m.,

AT THE

West London Institute of Music,

78 & 80, EDGWARE ROAD, HYDE PARK, W.

(*Corner of Stourcliffe St.,*)

AND AT

MARBLE ARCH, HYDE PARK, AT 3-30 P.M. (weather permitting),

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION.

These Meetings are announced every Saturday in the *Echo*, *Sun*, and *Star*; and every Sunday in *Lloyds'*, *Reynolds'*, *Sunday Sun*, *Weekly Times & Echo*: *Clarion*, etc.

Evening Lectures.

June 4th—"The Old Law and the New." - W. MACDONALD.

,, 11th—"Private Property in Land." - - "J. P. H."

Fig. 1. *Pamphlet advertising meetings of the London Tolstoyan Society.*

Tolstoyans in Britain were rapidly in touch with their counterparts in Russia. Inspired by Tolstoy's warm reception of his letters and his own writings, the leading British Tolstoyan John Kenworthy embarked on a trip to Russia in 1896 during which he met a number of Russian Tolstoyans, including Vladimir Chertkov, Evgenii Popov, and Ivan Gorbunov-Posadov. A return visit to Britain by Gorbunov-Posadov later that year cemented the relationship: they were in frequent contact by mail also about publishing matters. While Britain was already a dynamic centre for Tolstoyism, its place at the centre of the international movement was cemented by the exile to England of Vladimir Chertkov in 1897 (for his work on behalf of the persecuted Doukhobors). Chertkov was joined over the next year or so by other leading and low-level Russian Tolstoyans, briefly or more permanently, at the "Russian colony" he established alongside the English Tolstoyan colony at Purleigh. The presence of the Russians, British freedom in publishing and politics, and the relocation to England of the campaign for the Doukhobors – including fundraising and logistics for the emigration of members of the sect – all combined to create a truly international centre for Tolstoyism that included also Slovak, Dutch and American Tolstoyans in Britain. Chertkov's position as Tolstoy's closest associate and now his principal representative in England – a position he guarded jealously – put him at the centre of this movement. British Tolstoyans sought his presence at their meetings, and his clarification of what Tolstoy's views, and his own, might be on a range of subjects – the use of money, diet, and the "sex question". Chertkov's closeness to Tolstoy and his own commanding personality drew numerous sympathetic individuals into his service, working on translation, editing or printing for his publishing projects. Tolstoy's English adherents did not always submit to Chertkov's point of view however: they upbraided him on occasion for refusing to engage with criticisms of Tolstoy, or for endorsing Tolstoy in argument without explaining why he, himself, agreed with Tolstoy's position.

The central tenet of the Tolstoyan worldview was the belief in absolute non-resistance to evil. Tolstoyans struggled sincerely with this issue, debated it on the fringes and outside their movement, and faced in head on, sometimes in mundane aspects of everyday life, in social interaction and in commercial transactions. While Tolstoyans interacted with (for example) dress reformers, vegetarians, and anti-vivisectionists, they were prevented from cooperating fully with any of these other reformist organisations by their commitment to non-resistance. Their refusal to participate in political, governmental or legal processes divided them from anti-vivisectionists because they could not condone legislative solutions, and from pacifists because they saw no use in arbitration or lobbying for disarmament. It divided them from members of the socialist and even the cooperative movement, because they disapproved of organization or political representation. In 1900, when Percy Redfern established the Manchester Tolstoy Society, he explained the rationale as follows. "Now I can temporarily associate with different groups – vegetarians, socialists, land reformers, 'rationalists', theosophists, Wesleyans, and so forth. If I had some definite bias towards any particular material reform that might content me. But I want to face life as a whole… Hence a Tolstoy society". This perception of Tolstoyism as a complete world view, underpinned by the principle of non-resistance, informed many Tolstoyan conversion accounts. Tolstoy answered the contradiction that many of his readers, whether businessmen, aristocrats, shopkeepers, soldiers or active members of the

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socialist movement felt in their lives. He asked them to be honest with themselves and with others: to follow their own conscience and reason, and not to carry on behaving in the ways that conventional society demanded. He did not allow for any compromise between their ideals and their actions; he resolved all doubts.

Clearly there were tensions between the imperative not to compromise, and the desire both to spread the word and to make Tolstoyan enterprises a success that would inspire further recruits. Their principles could pose a threat to their practices, and their practices could pose a threat to their principles. Tolstoyan publishing houses were a case in point. *Posrednik*, the principle Tolstoyan publishing house in Russia, benefitted enormously from the trade connections and networks of Ivan Sytin, a commercial publisher who distributed books in the countryside. Sytin welcomed the opportunity to apply his business expertise to a project that he considered had moral worth, but never entirely distanced himself from his commercial operations, some of which involved the publication of precisely the kind of material the Tolstoyans sought to combat. *Posrednik* eventually dispensed with Sytin's services, and the quality of their publications and distribution suffered as a result. Likewise, Arthur Fifield, the manager of the English Tolstoyan publishing hosue the Free Age Press, sought to steer a course between managing an ethical business, and managing a successful business. He knew that opposition to all copyright was the Tolstoyan ideal, "just as giving the books away without any charge is the ideal, getting the paper made for nothing, composing, printing, binding, distributing and living without financial relations are also the ideal". But the general consciousness had not yet reached the point where it was impossible to impose one's will on editors, translators or booksellers, without a negative impact both on the effective spread of the ideas.

Likewise, the Tolstoyans who established communal agricultural enterprises faced challenges to their principles, and challenges to putting them into practice. Some hard workers resented others who they felt were doing less


ИСТИННАЯ СВОБОДА
РЕЛИГИОЗНО-ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ, ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЙ И ЛИТЕРАТУРНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ
ПОД РЕДАКЦИЕЙ ВАЛ. БУЛГАКОВА И АЛЕКСЕЯ СЕРГЕЕНКО
№ 1. АПРЕЛЬ 1920.
СОДЕРЖАНИЕ: От редакции. — Мысли об истинной свободе. — „О молитве". *А. С.* — Стих. „После молитвы". *Вал. Булгакова.* — Стих. „Учительница". *И. И. Горбунова-Посадова.* — 35-летний юбилей Кн-ва „Посредник". — Из истории отказов от военной службы по религиозным убеждениям. *А. Нелидова.* — Ведомость отказов от военной службы при царском режиме. (Оффиц. документ). — „В защиту гонимых". Обращение *В. Булгакова, И. Горбунова-Посадова, В. Черткова* и др. — Дружеское общение. (Письма, мысли, заметки и пр.). — Вести пробуждения. — К отмене смертной казни. — Новые книги. *Вал. Б.* — Об'явление о журнале.

Fig. 2. *Florence Holah's copy of the Russian Tolstoyan periodical "Istinnaya Svoboda", 1920.*

to get their enterprises onto a self-sufficient footing. But the question of organization was fundamentally problematic. Was it possible to work hard and organize and still live the "right life" spiritually? Self-sufficiency required organization. A commitment to complete non-resistance required that their be no organization. Tolstoyan colonists either entered into communal projects with little clarity about how the society they wished to create ought to operate, or they worked this out in detail but thereby compromised the ideal.

During the war and revolution, Tolstoyism experienced a revival in Russia. The war brought new converts, and provided a fresh focus for existing Tolstoyans. In the 1920s there were at least 23 different Tolstoyan communities across Soviet Russia, in locations including Smolensk, Vladimir and Tula. In Britain there was little trace of an organized Tolstoyan movement by the 1920s. A group of Tolstoyans in Leeds provided a safehouse for conscientious objectors who had not been granted exemption, and published many anti-war pamphlets. Several former Tolstoyans were prosecuted for publishing radical pacifist literature during the war. Florence Holah received copies of the new Russian Tolstoyan periodicals that were published during the revolutionary years (*fig. 2*), but this is a rare example of international connections between Tolstoyan groups and individuals by this time. In the 1970s, the memoirs of Russian Tolstoyans of this period were collected and recorded.

Boris Mazurin, speaking about the Life and Labour Commune in Siberia, asked rhetorically "Did those of us who gathered together in the commune do justice to the name of Leo Tolstoy, with whose noble ideas we united our lives? Did we achieve in our lives the heights and fullness of the teaching we had accepted? No, of course not". But, "Did we strive to achieve it? Yes we did! Our aspirations were ardent, powerful, sincere, honest and bold". And in that respect, with Tolstoyans of the 1890s who sought to put Tolstoy's beliefs into practice through communal living, through their vegetarianism, through opposition to the state, to the use of money, to marriage, and of course through opposition to war, they had much in common.

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